















The U.S.-Mexico case (2002-2004) was the first (and so far only) case of World Trade 
Organization (WTO) dispute resolution on telecommunications services and the first on 
services only. The findings of the Panel charged with settling the dispute contain 
interpretations of the General Agreement on Trade in Service (GATS), especially its 
Annex on Telecommunications and the Reference Paper that sets regulatory principles. 
Although these interpretations strictly apply only to the case examined, they have 
implications for other countries and sectors and beyond trade law. The following are 
some of these findings. Telecommunications services originated in one country and 
terminated in another country are cross-border services under the GATS irrespective of 
whether the same service provider is present in both countries. The accounting rate 
regime, whereby operators share revenue from international services provided jointly, is 
subject to the discipline of cost-based interconnection for countries that have adopted the 
Reference Paper. Uniform settlement rates and proportional return are anticompetitive 
practices under the Reference Paper even when they are mandated by law. Lack of 
implementing regulations does not excuse the country from meeting its commitments 
under the GATS. Mexico and the U.S., although not in full agreement with the Panel, did 
not appeal. An agreed plan to address the underlying legal and regulatory issues was  
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The U.S.-Mexico case is the first (and so far only) case of World Trade Organization 
(WTO) dispute resolution on telecommunications services and, indeed, the first on 
services generally. The findings of the Panel charged with resolving the dispute, formally 
adopted by the WTO members, contain interpretations of the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS). The specific details of any case are unique and the findings in 
this case apply only to Mexico. Many governments, however, have made market access 
commitments on telecommunications under the auspices of the GATS, and more intend 
to do so in the context of the ongoing Doha trade negotiations. Hence, the interpretative 
elements of the findings have implications beyond those for the case at hand. 
 
The WTO in Brief 
 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) is the international body where global rules for 
trade among nations are agreed. The WTO was created in 1994 at the conclusion of the 
Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The GATT 
agreement and provisional secretariat had administered the rules for much of the world’s 
merchandise trade since 1948. At the center of the new multilateral trade system resulting 
from the Uruguay Round are agreements on trade in goods, trade in services, trade-
related aspects of intellectual property rights, a dispute settlement understanding, and a 
trade policy review mechanism.
1  
 
The General Agreement of Trade in Services (GATS) came into force at the conclusion 
of the Uruguay Round. It consists of the Articles of Agreement and its Annexes, and the 
schedules of specific commitments (and lists of exemptions from most favored nation 
treatment, MFN) submitted by member governments.
2 The schedules and exemption lists 
are integral parts of the GATS. It is by reference to a country’s schedule and MFN 
exemptions that it can be seen under what conditions the basic principles of the GATS 
(MFN treatment, market access, and national treatment) are applied by the government 
concerned to particular services.
3 The schedule identifies the service sectors to which the 
country will apply the market access and national treatment obligations of the GATS and 
any limitations to these obligations it wishes to maintain. These commitments and 
limitations are specified separately for each of four modes of supply that constitute the 
definition of trade in services in the GATS: cross-border supply, consumption abroad, 
commercial presence, and temporary presence of natural persons.
4 Of these, cross-border 
and commercial presence are the most relevant for telecommunications.  
 
The GATS Annex on Telecommunications contains obligations regarding   
telecommunications networks and services. The Annex requires member governments to 
ensure that their telecommunications suppliers give access to and use of public 
telecommunications, on reasonable terms and conditions, to service suppliers from other 
countries supplying any services included in the member country’s schedule. The Annex 
also ensures the freedom of movement of information within and across borders for 
purposes of providing scheduled services. And it limits the restrictions that can be placed 
on access and use of public telecommunications to those needed to safeguard public 
service and the technical integrity of the networks, as well as to prevent the supply of   3
telecommunications services by other countries other than as provided for in the host 
country's schedule of commitments.             
 
The GATS provides for the resolution of disputes between member countries with respect 
to compliance with obligations under the GATS, including annexes and specific and 
additional country commitments. A WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding establishes 
the procedure to be followed.
5 
 
On completion of the Uruguay Round in 1994, WTO member countries set up a 
Negotiating Group on Basic Telecommunications (NGBT) to agree on specific 
commitments to liberalize the telecommunications markets within the framework of the 
GATS. Participants in the NGBT also negotiated a common text, called the Reference 
Paper, that would serve as a template for scheduling additional commitments on 
regulatory principles for the sector (see Box 1). By the close of negotiations in 1997, 55 
schedules had been agreed by 69 countries and were annexed as the Fourth Protocol of 
the GATS.
6  The collection of specific and additional commitments negotiated under the 
NGBT is commonly known as the Agreement on Basic Telecommunications Services.
7 A 
further 24 countries have made specific commitments on basic telecommunications since 





The Telecommunications Reference Paper 
 
Besides specific commitments to liberalize telecommunications markets, many countries have 
adopted the Reference Paper as an additional commitment under the GATS. The Reference Paper 
becomes part of a country’s legally binding obligations only when it is included in its schedule. 
Most countries (including Mexico) have adopted the Reference Paper verbatim, but a few have 
adopted modified forms. 
 
The Reference Paper is a brief document (2-1/2 pages) that contains definitions and principles on 
the regulatory framework for basic telecommunications services. The Reference Paper provides 
broad principles and guidelines but leaves it to individual member countries to interpret this 
general framework and translate it into specific legislation and regulation. 
 
WTO member countries that adopt the Reference Paper mainly commit to: 
 
•  Establish a regulatory authority that is independent of all suppliers of telecommunications 
services and networks 
•  Maintain  measures that prevent and safeguard against anti-competitive practices by major 
suppliers 
•  Require major suppliers to interconnect other suppliers at any technically feasible point on a 
non-discriminatory, cost-oriented basis following transparent procedures and subject to 
dispute settlement by an independent body 
•  Administer universal service programs in a transparent, non-discriminatory, and 
competitively neutral manner   4
•  Allocate and assign use of scarce resources, including the radio spectrum, numbering blocks, 
and rights of way, in an objective, timely, transparent, and non-discriminatory manner. 
 
A major supplier is defined as a supplier that, through control of essential facilities or use of 
market position, can materially affect the price and supply in the relevant market. 
 
Source: WTO 1996 
   5
 
The Dispute on Mexico  
 
WTO handling of the dispute concerning Mexico was initiated in 2000 by the U.S., 
following many months of bilateral efforts to resolve the issue directly between both 
countries. In August 2000 the U.S. requested consultations, under WTO auspices, on 
Mexico’s obligations on basic and value-added services under the GATS Annex on 
Telecommunications and the Reference Paper.  Successive rounds of consultations did 
not resolve the issues raised, and in February 2002 the U.S. formally requested the 
establishment of a Panel under revised claims (that no longer included value-added 
services). In August 2002, after several months of negotiation between the parties (the 
U.S. and Mexican government representatives) on the selection of Panelists, the WTO 
constituted the Panel. The Panel met initially with the parties and with the third-parties 
having an interest in the case, and several times thereafter to develop and draft its 
findings.
9 The Panel issued its final report to the parties in March 2004. Although the 
parties claimed not to be satisfied with all aspects of the Panel findings, neither party 
elected to take the Panel decision to the WTO Appellate Body. As a result, the WTO’s 
Dispute Settlement Body adopted the Panel report, by consensus, in June 2004. The 
parties agreed on, and submitted to the WTO, a plan to redress the underlying problems 




Milestones of the dispute resolution process 
 
August 2000  U.S. requests WTO consultations on Mexico’s  
GATS telecommunications services obligations 
October 2000  Initial consultations. Helpful, but do not  resolve disagreement 
January 2001  Additional consultations but little progress 
February 2002  U.S. files request for formal dispute resolution panel 
April 2002  WTO establishes dispute resolution panel 
August 2002   Panel members selected 
December 2002  First meeting of panel with parties 
March 2003  Second meeting with parties 
November 2003  Panel submits draft report for review by parties 
April  2004  Panel submits final report 
June 2004  DSB adopts panel report 




The services subject to the U.S. complaint were public voice telephony, circuit-switched 
data transmission, and facsimile services, provided both on a facilities- and non-facilities 
basis.
10 Mexico had scheduled telecommunications commitments under the GATS 
Articles XVI (market access), XVII (national treatment), and XVIII (additional 
commitments, comprising the Reference Paper). These commitments obliged Mexico, 
among other things, to ensure cost-based interconnection, prevent anti-competitive 
practices, and give foreign service suppliers access to Mexican networks. Summarized in 
plain language, the U.S. claimed that, with respect to the services at issue, Mexico had:   6
 
•  Failed to ensure that TELMEX, the largest operator, interconnects U.S. cross-border 
suppliers of these services on cost-oriented, reasonable rates, terms, and conditions. 
This was inconsistent with Sections 2.1 and 2.2 of its Reference Paper. 
•  Failed to prevent anticompetitive behavior, as regulations empowered TELMEX to 
fix rates for international interconnection on behalf of all suppliers in the market, 
resulting in a cartel.  This was inconsistent with Section 1.1 of its Reference Paper. 
•  Failed to ensure access by U.S. suppliers to public telecommunications networks in 
Mexico, thus preventing them from providing non-facilities based services within 
Mexico (through commercial agencies or ‘comercializadoras’) and international 
simple resale (through cross-border leased circuits). This was inconsistent with 
Articles 5a and 5b of the GATS Annex on Telecommunications. 
  
Other telecommunications-related disputes between WTO Members had been under 
discussion and one or two had nearly come to the WTO before being settled through 
purely bilateral channels.
11 That this dispute became the first to undergo the formal WTO 
dispute settlement mechanism was in large part due to the economic significance of the 
trade concerned. In 2000, Mexico accounted for 16 percent of total outgoing U.S. 
international telephone traffic. Net international settlements from U.S. operators to 
foreign correspondents reached a record high $3.9 billion in 2002, of which about 19 
percent was paid to Mexican operators. Although settlements had been declining from 
1998, they remained high in comparison to more competitive high-traffic routes (such as 
between the U.S. and Canada and the United Kingdom, see Figure 1) and about double 
the Federal Communications Commission’s benchmark for U.S. operators sending traffic 
into Mexico. Although Mexico’s international long distance market had been open to 
competition since 1997, by 2000 TELMEX’s market share still exceeded 60 percent and 
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The Panel mostly agreed with the U.S. claims, but found that Mexico had not committed 
to allow international simple resale and thus was not in violation of its obligations on that 
count. The final report of 250 pages explains in detail how the Panel reached these 
conclusions (WTO 2004). For illustration, the following are some of the arguments, 
related primarily to the Reference Paper, cast in plain language. 
 
Definition of cross-border services. A key question related to compliance with Sections 
2.1 and 2.2 of the Reference Paper was whether the services at issue were supplied cross-
border, as the U.S. claimed, or, as Mexico argued, were merely services provided by U.S. 
firms up to the Mexican border from where they were provided by Mexican firms. Article 
I:2 of the GATS defines four modes of trade in services, of which the first mode, usually 
referred to as cross-border, comprises “…the supply of a service…from the territory of 
one Member into the territory of any other Member…”. The distinction mattered because 




The Panel concluded that a telephone call originated in the U.S. and terminated in 
Mexico was indeed a cross-border service irrespective of whether the U.S. firm had its 
own facilities in Mexico or made arrangements with Mexican firms to carry the call from 
the border to its final destination. Summarizing part of the argument, the Panel explained 
that the supply of “…telecommunications services normally involve or require the 
linking with another operator to complete the service, and the operation, or presence in 
some way, of the supplier on both ends of the service cannot therefore be a necessary 
element of the definition of cross-border supply.” 
13 “More generally, a supplier of 
services under the GATS is no less of a supplier solely because elements of the service 
are subcontracted to another firm, or are carried out with assets owned by another firm. 
What counts is the service that the supplier offers and has agreed to supply to a 
customer.” 
14  Had the panel agreed with Mexico's position, there would have been no 
grounds to consider the U.S. claims and, as a consequence, most cross border traffic 


















Cost-oriented interconnection. Section 2.2 of the Reference Paper requires that 
“Interconnection with a major supplier be ensured at…cost-oriented rates that are 
transparent, reasonable, having regard to economic feasibility, and sufficiently unbundled 
so that the supplier need not pay for network components or facilities that it does not 
require…”. The U.S. presented several estimations of the cost incurred in terminating 
international calls in Mexico, based on available information including TELMEX’s 
domestic interconnection charges, and argued that the settlement rates that U.S. 
companies were required to pay were above each of these cost estimates - on average 2.5 
times higher. Mexico did not offer comments on these cost estimates and settlement 
charges, and it did not take up the Panel’s invitation to submit is own calculations.  
 
The Panel concluded that the difference between the costs presented to it and the 
settlement rates was “…unlikely to be within the scope of regulatory flexibility allowed 
by the notion of cost-oriented rates…” of the Reference Paper.
15 In reaching this 
conclusion, the Panel emphasized that only costs directly incurred in providing 
interconnection are relevant.
16 Costs for general development of the network and for 
universal service programs, in particular, were not deemed relevant to determining the 
cost basis for interconnection rates. The Panel did not endorse any particular costing 
model, and recognized that more than one costing methodology could be used, but it 
stated that incremental cost methods, such as the long range average incremental cost 
methodology prescribed in Mexico’s telecommunications law for certain purposes, are 
consistent with this concept.
17 
 
Rather than challenge the cost figures presented by the U.S., Mexico argued that the 
settlement rates pertained to the international accounting rate regime, not an 
interconnection regime.
18 At the time negotiations on basic telecommunications services 
came to closure in 1997, an unbinding understanding had been reached among the 
negotiating parties that accounting rates would not be used as a basis of disputes. 
Otherwise, most countries would have found it necessary to file exemptions to MFN 
treatment under GATS Article II.  
 
The Panel, however, found that the accounting rate regime is subject to the discipline of 
cost-based interconnection for countries that have adopted the Reference Paper. While 
the 1997 understanding prevented disputes arising under the GATS framework agreement 
from different accounting rates with different countries, it did not exempt countries from 
any of their obligations, including cost-based interconnection, once they had also adopted 
the Reference Paper.  
 
Anti-competitive practices. Section 1.1 of the Reference Paper establishes that 
“Appropriate measures shall be maintained for the purposes of preventing suppliers who, 
alone or together, are a major supplier from engaging or continuing anti-competitive 
practices”. The Mexican rules for international telephone service required that the 
Mexican operator with the largest outgoing traffic over an international route should 
negotiate the settlement rate for terminating incoming calls over that route, and required 
this rate to apply to all operators (‘uniform settlements rates’). Since TELMEX had the   9
most outgoing traffic in all routes to the U.S., it was in practice the sole negotiator of 
settlement rates that applied as well to its competitors.
19 The rules also required that 
incoming calls be distributed for termination among Mexican operators in proportion to 
each operator’s outgoing traffic (‘proportional return’). Mexican operators being offered 
more than their share of incoming calls should route them over to another operator or 
compensate it for the difference in revenue. The U.S. argued that uniform settlement rates 
and proportional return resulted in a cartel that fixes prices and market shares, so Mexico 
had failed to maintain ‘appropriate measures’ to prevent anti-competitive practices. 
Mexico argued that the rules had been designed precisely to prevent anti-competitive 
behavior by large foreign operators playing off Mexican companies against one other 
down to unsustainable prices. 
 
The Panel found that uniform settlement rates and proportional returns required Mexican 
operators to engage in practices that were tantamount to a cartel and hence were anti-
competitive. Mexico, therefore, had not met its obligation under Section 1 to take 
measures to prevent such practices. The Panel, furthermore, clarified that the anti-
competitive practices concerned fell within the scope of the Reference Paper even when, 
as in the case of Mexico, they were mandated by government rules. A longstanding 
international legal principle was thus reinforced, namely that a government must bring its 
domestic laws and regulations into conformity with the treaty obligations it undertakes. 
 
Application of the Annex on Telecommunications. Article 5(a) of the Annex on 
Telecommunications states that “Each Member shall ensure that any service supplier of 
any other Member is accorded access to and use of public telecommunications…on 
reasonable and non-discriminatory terms and conditions, for the supply of a service 
included in its Schedule.” Article 5(b) adds that “Each Member country shall ensure that 
service suppliers of any other Member have access to and use of any public 
telecommunications…network or service offered within or across the border of that 
Member, including private leased circuits…”. This means, essentially, that when a 
country commits to open up a particular market (e.g. financial services), foreign suppliers 
of these services are entitled to use the host country’s telecommunications networks and 
services to pursue their business. The U.S. argued that U.S. suppliers should be allowed 
to interconnect international leased circuits to Mexican networks to terminate incoming 
calls originated in the U.S. (international simple resale) as well as provide services to 
Mexican customers through ‘comercializadoras’ by leasing facilities owned by Mexican 
concessionaires. The U.S. also argued that the interconnection prices being charged to 
U.S. suppliers were not ‘reasonable’. Mexico held that Articles 5(a) and 5(b) applied only 
towards meeting the telecommunications needs of suppliers of other services, not the 
provision of telecommunications services per se, and in any case were limited to services 
for which Mexico had undertaken market access obligations. 
 
The Panel clarified that interconnection and the ability to interconnect and lease circuits 
were forms of ‘access’ to the services at issue, and therefore the provisions in the Annex 
applied to them.
20 The Panel upheld the U.S. position regarding the provision of non-
facilities services through ‘comercializadoras’. The fact that regulations were not in place 
to license U.S. (or any other) suppliers to provide this form of service, did not excuse   10
Mexico from meeting its commitment to market access through commercial presence. 
The Panel, however, sided with Mexico regarding international simple resale, since 
Mexico had not undertaken commitments on cross-border market provision of non-
facilities based services.  
 
The Panel also found that ‘reasonable access and use’ of public telecommunications 
includes prices. Since the Panel had already concluded that Mexico’s interconnection 
prices did not meet the requirement of cost orientation under the Reference Paper, this 
finding under the Annex did not add anything new in this case.  
 
Initial Effects in Mexico 
 
The agreement reached between Mexico and the U.S. in April 2004 called for the 
following actions: 
 
•  Within two months of adoption of the Panel’s report, Mexico will revise its 
international long distance rules to allow competitive negotiation of settlement 
rates by eliminating uniform settlement rates, proportional returns, and the 
requirement that the operator with most outbound traffic negotiate the settlement 
rate on behalf of all Mexican operators 
•  Within 13 months, Mexico will have in force regulations to license 
‘comercializadoras’ allowed to resell international switched telecommunications 
services provided by Mexican concessionaires 
•  Mexico will continue to restrict international simple resale (use of leased lines to 
carry cross-border calls) 
 
The Panel report was adopted in June 2004. The agreed implementation plan is well 
underway. 
 
Rules for international telecommunications services. New international rules applicable 
to all telecommunications services were approved by Comisión Federal de 
Telecomunicaciones (COFETEL, the regulatory authority) in June 2004 and published in 
August 2004.
21 The old uniform settlements and proportional return rules have been   
abolished. Now Mexican operators of international long distance services are free to 
negotiate individually the terms and conditions of interconnection with foreign operators, 
including prices for incoming and outgoing traffic. Foreign operators decide to which 
Mexican operators they wish to deliver their traffic for termination in Mexico. Thus 
Mexican operators can compete effectively with one another in the large wholesale 
market of terminating incoming traffic.  
 
The new rules also allow more effective competition in the retail market of outgoing 
traffic. The uniform settlement rates had also applied to payments by Mexican operators 
to foreign operators for terminating outgoing calls in other countries. This largely ruled 
out price competition in Mexico as a means for any operator to increase its share of 
outgoing calls. Since the share of incoming settlements was determined by the share of   11
outgoing traffic (rule of proportional returns), the old rules in practice made both the call 
termination and origination markets largely non-competitive.
22  
 
The new rules do not say how international interconnection should be priced, nor is this 
required under the agreement. The rules, however, establish that termination charges in 
Mexico cannot be below the cost incurred in providing this service.
23 This reflects a 
provision in the telecommunications law aimed at preventing predatory pricing of any 
telecommunications service by a major supplier. The rules do not say how cost would be 
determined, but the law refers explicitly to long run average incremental costs. Also, in 
the explanation of the new rules, reference is made to ITU recommendations towards 
cost-based interconnection. 
 
Mexican operators reportedly have started to negotiate individually with their 
counterparts in the U.S. According to COFETEL, prior approval and publication of these 
agreements, as well as approval of points of international interconnection, have been 
simplified and expedited. Processing time is reportedly down to about 16 days. Total 
incoming international traffic in 2004 increased by 31 percent
24 and TELMEX’s by 55 
percent (TELMEX 2004). This rapid growth is attributed largely to the new rules having 
reduced the incentive for illegal bypass.
25 Freeing termination charges and ending 
proportional returns are seen as the main factors (COFETEL 2004b). It is too early to 
assess the extent to which competitive interconnection charges result in lower prices to 
users, traffic growth, or changes in market shares.  
 
These improvements are expected to benefit business and residential users of 
international services and increase competitiveness of the Mexican economy overall. 
Mexican operating companies with limited direct involvement in the provision of 
international services but underutilized domestic networks are likely to develop a 
substantial business as providers of alternative infrastructures to carry international traffic 
within Mexico. Some of these companies may use this new cash flow to strengthen their 
presence in the domestic markets, or may become attractive merger or acquisition targets 
(Carreño et al.2005). 
 
Rules for licensing ‘comercializadoras’. COFETEL has submitted to Secretaría de 
Comunicaciones y Transporte, the line ministry, a draft of the rules to issue licenses to 
commercial agencies that would be authorized to provide international 
telecommunications services using the facilities of Mexican concessionaires. The rules 
would be issued in June 2005. 
 
International simple resale. Mexico continues to prohibit international simple resale, as 
agreed. The new rules for international telecommunications services are clear on this, 
both in the explanatory notes and the rules themselves. International interconnection can 
only take place at gateways approved by COFETEL. Only Mexican companies that have 
concessions to install, operate, and exploit public telecommunications networks 
authorized to provide international services can receive authorization to set up 
international gateways. These gateways must offer interconnection services to all 
concessionaires without discrimination.    12
 
These remaining restrictions, while consistent with the WTO resolution and the 
agreement with the U.S., constitute important barriers to entry in the international 
telecommunications services market. Also, TELMEX is by far the largest operator and 
has control over major network elements and functions that are essential for completing 
incoming calls. TELMEX’s domestic long distance network is the largest in the country 
and the only one reaching several hundred mid-size and small towns. TELMEX is still 
the sole provider of local telephones in many places. Observers note that COFETEL has 
not been particularly successful so far in containing abuse of market power (Carreño et 
al. 2005). 
 
Implications for Telecommunications Beyond Mexico 
 
The Panel report states clearly that its findings apply solely to the specific case of Mexico 
brought to its consideration. But insofar as the Panel’s analysis and conclusions clarify 
aspects of both the Reference Paper and the GATS Annex on Telecommunications, it can 
be expected to have a significant influence on telecommunications policy and regulation 
beyond the case of Mexico. The following are some examples. 
 
International accounting rates, according to the Panel report, are subject to cost-based 
interconnection discipline. While countries can continue to use the accounting rate 
regime as one of the commercial modalities to compensate companies for jointly 
providing international service, adoption of the Reference Paper requires that such 
payments to major suppliers be cost-oriented.
26 This adds pressure towards reducing the 
level of accounting rates, and more generally replacing the accounting rate regime by an 
interconnection regime as befits an increasingly competitive global telecommunications 
market. While things have been moving in this direction for some time driven by 
economic and technological factors, and reflected in guidelines from the ITU and 
regional organizations, the Panel’s ruling is likely to accelerate change (Guermazi 2004).    
 
Regarding interconnection rates, the Panel determined that only costs related to 
interconnection itself can be reflected in prices that are required under the Reference 
Paper to be cost-oriented. It is not that the Reference Paper ignores other costs that the 
supplier must also recover, such as the cost of general network development or of 
universal service, but rather that they cannot be financed by distorting interconnection 
price structures. In fact, the Reference Paper explicitly recognizes the right of member 
countries to maintain universal service programs, provided they are administered in a 
transparent, non-discriminatory, and competitively neutral manner and are not 
excessively burdensome (Reference Paper, Section 3). As to how interconnection costs 
should be determined, the Panel remained silent but commented that long range 
incremental cost pricing models are consistent with the principle of reflecting on prices 
only the costs caused by the service. Also the Panel ruling does not mean that prices must 
be set equal to costs, but rather that prices should bear a clear and reasonable relationship 
to costs.  
   13
The Panel clarified that the benefits of the Annex on Telecommunications accrue to 
suppliers of basic telecommunications services. Under the GATS Annex on 
Telecommunications, foreign banks, insurance companies, hotels, transportation 
companies, and others allowed to provide services in the country, are assured they can 
use available public telecommunications on reasonable and non-discriminatory 
conditions to carry out their business. The Panel clarified that this right applies also to 
foreign providers of scheduled telecommunications services, including using the 
incumbent’s facilities to compete against it. Moreover, the Panel concluded that under the 
Annex on Telecommunications, which is an integral part of the GATS, even members 
that have not committed to the Reference Paper are subjected to a price discipline of 
sorts, for those telecommunications services included in their schedules.
27  
 
The Panel’s ruling may provide a basis for challenging other telecommunications 
services in other countries.
28 This could be the case of high fixed-to-mobile termination 
charges and lack of access to leased lines by mobile and Internet service providers. As 
mobile communication services grow quickly, the terms and conditions of 
interconnection with fixed networks become critical.
29 Generally subject to lighter 
regulation than fixed services, the mobile market has in recent years attracted regulatory 
attention because of multi-country mergers and acquisitions, high termination charges, 
non-transparent retail tariffs, and disputes over the division of fixed-to-mobile call 
revenues and technical access. Lack of local access leased circuits for Internet service 
providers (ISP), or terms and conditions that discriminate in favor of the incumbent’s 
own Internet operation, coupled to prohibition of competing ISPs from building their own 
networks, have been major factors holding back Internet development in some parts of 
the world (Serot et al. 2003). 
 
Implications Beyond Telecommunications 
 
The Panel’s findings clarify certain aspects of the GATS that are significant beyond the 
telecommunications sector. 
 
At the core of the Panel’s ruling is its conclusion that cross-border market access 
commitments under the GATS apply even when the supplier is not present in the country 
where the service is terminated. What gives the service its cross-border nature is that a 
service contracted in one country is delivered in another. This applies irrespective of 
whether the originating service supplier has its own operation in the terminating country 
or makes arrangements with another to deliver the service.
30 This conclusion has 
potential implications for other networked services industries, such as electricity, 
transport services, and postal and courier services. Some observers, however, have 
argued that the services at issue in the case of Mexico were not cross-border services at 
all but rather domestic services within the U.S. and export interconnection services from 
Mexico to the U.S (Neven et al. 2005).
31 A widely accepted understanding of the reach of 
cross-border delivery would have potential implications for electronically delivered 
content services (Hauser 2004). 
   14
Once commitments are agreed and in place, they are interpreted equally strictly for all 
countries. The GATS gives developing countries special consideration in terms of the 
pace at which they commit to liberalization. The Panel clarified, however, that this 
applies only during the negotiation stage, when specific and additional commitments are 
being traded off among countries. This emphasizes the need for developing countries to 
understand clearly what they are committing to do, and make sure that they will be able 
to stand up to those obligations if challenged. Nonetheless, in ruling against the U.S. 
claims with regard to international simple resale, the Panel clearly indicated a respect for 
recognizing the line between services that are committed and those that are not.   
 
The Panel also clarified that lack of implementing rules and regulations cannot be used as 
excuse to delay the effectiveness of market access commitments undertaken in the 
schedule. Mexico had committed to commercial presence of foreign service providers 
through ‘comercializadoras’, essentially non-facilities based operating companies, 
indicating in the schedule that licensing of such providers would not begin until the 
regulations were published. But seven years after this commitment became effective, the 
rules for licensing ‘comercializadoras’ had not been enacted so none had been licensed.  
Although the Panel did not say how soon the implementing rules should be in place, it 
found that seven years was too long. The broad conclusion is that implementing rules 
should be in place at the time commitments become effective, or bona fide action should 
be underway to have them soon. 
 
Implications Beyond Trade Law  
 
The Panel adopted a wide interpretation of what constitute anti-competitive practices. It 
ruled that a cartel is a type of practice against which appropriate preventive measures 
should be maintained, although it is not explicitly mentioned in the Reference Paper. In 
this respect, the panel clarified that the scope of the obligation to safeguard against anti-
competitive practices was comprehensive.   
 
This has proven to be a highly contentious outcome. Some authors believe that the 
Panel’s report will become a landmark for interpreting GATS commitments and look 
forward to more cases of similar reach and quality of deliberation (Hauser 2004). Others, 
however, find the Panel to have been exceedingly weak in terms of economic and 
competition analysis (Marsden 2004, Sidak et al. 2004), offer alternative interpretations 
of the issues that would have led to very different conclusions (Neven et al. 2005), or 
worry that dispute settlement panels may create new commitments to open markets where 
none have been agreed by negotiators (Marsden 2004, Sharma et al. 2004). Some believe 
the U.S. operating companies, rather than Mexican or U.S. users, will be the primary 
beneficiaries of the WTO decision, and that more effective competition among U.S. 
suppliers pursued in the context of U.S. anti-trust law would have had a greater impact 
than dispute resolution at the level of international trade treaty (Sidak et al. 2004). These 
and other reservations deserve serious consideration by telecommunications and trade 
experts, especially as more developing countries commit to further liberalization and 
global markets become more competitive. It is beyond this note, however, to comment on 
the relative merits of these views.   15
 
The Panel also found that anti-competitive behavior by suppliers of services for which 
GATS commitments to competitive supply have been undertaken cannot be excused by 
national law. Specifically, the cartel led by TELMEX was not only tolerated by the 
government and regulator but was actually mandated by Mexico’s rules for international 
services. Mexico argued that these provisions had been built into the rules precisely to 
prevent Mexican firms from being played off against one another by powerful foreign 
operators often acting together. Although this may have been sensible in the early days of 
opening its markets, and, in fact, was commonly used by suppliers in competitive markets 
when dealing with monopoly markets, now it is seen in the context of relations between 
competitive markets to be unduly restrictive.
32 
 
Issues for the Doha Round 
 
In the ongoing round of trade negotiations, a number of telecommunications-related 
issues have been tabled.
33 A major negotiating goal, as revealed by country proposals, is 
to achieve more widespread liberalization of trade in telecommunications services with 
more countries undertaking commitments. The proposals also seek to revise existing 
schedules and significantly reduce the number and scope of limitations to both market 
access and national treatment. The Reference Paper is receiving considerable attention. 
All negotiating proposals submitted suggested that more governments should undertake 
the Reference Paper. One proposal (by a middle-income country) suggested converting 
the Reference Paper to a GATS Annex, hence applicable to all WTO members. Other 
proposals invite adapting the Reference Paper model to other services sectors (EU 2000, 
EU 2003, US 2000a).
34  
 
As the Doha round is unfolding against the backdrop of spectacular technological 
developments and convergence of networks and services, many countries have tried to 
reflect these changes in their tabled offers. Many governments have emphasized the 
importance of telecommunications to take advantage of e-commerce and information and 
communication technology. Some countries have included Internet-based services in their 
telecommunications commitments. Other countries have linked their offers in the 
telecommunications sector to offers in complementary services such as advertising, 
express delivery, computer and related services, and financial services (US 2000b). Most 
developing countries are becoming increasingly aware of the potential for 
telecommunications liberalization to contribute to economic development strategies. As a 
result, from the vantage point of a variety of different motivations, the 
telecommunications sector and the prospect of new and improved commitments on 
telecommunications reform remain a priority in the Doha negotiations. 
 
The Mexico case adds urgency to addressing the tensions between trade and competition 
law in the telecommunications sector. No consensus has emerged on whether or how to 
address competition concerns within a global trade framework (Lloyd 1997, Hoekman 
1997). The Reference Paper could be seen as a legal instrument that approaches the 
problem through sector-specific regulatory commitments with competition policy 
elements. As the Mexico case showed, however, introducing broad competition policy   16
elements such as the notions of major supplier, dominance, essential facilities, and 
competitive safeguards, even when limited to one specific sector, can raise serious 
interpretative disputes. Short of a broad competition agreement, some observers suggest, 
it should be possible to reach consensus on some specific points by revising the GATS 
rules or providing more details in the Reference Paper or other sector-specific 
instruments. For example, it could be agreed whether governments are allowed to impose 
limitations on competition as part of their commitments, or that the GATS does not 
prejudge what is a cartel and that this is an issue that falls outside the scope of violation 
cases and hence cannot be litigated under the WTO. The issue is more complex than the 
specific case of cartels raised in Mexico, and merits a response in the way of a fresh 




Undertaking GATS obligations has broad domestic policy implications. The Mexico case 
unfolded in the context of domestic tensions that commonly arise, in both developed and 
developing countries, regarding how far, and how fast, governments should move to 
institute fully competitive legal frameworks for the telecommunications sector. 
Commitments under GATS to liberalize markets and follow the Reference Paper provide 
leverage to keep domestic telecommunications reforms on track and resist the inevitable 
pressures brought to bear by incumbents to slow down or reverse the process. These 
commitments, however, have an impact well beyond domestic agendas, and should not 
be undertaken without serious consideration of the capacity and political will to 
implement them. 
 
The GATS schedules are legally binding and enforceable treaty obligations. The Mexico 
case illustrates that undertaking and implementing the Reference Paper needs to be given 
considerable thought and effort. Governments now negotiating new or improved 
schedules should encourage their trade and telecommunications authorities to work 
closely together to make sure the trade commitments are consistent with realistic 
telecommunications reform agendas.
35 Governments will also need to make an informed 
decision on applying the GATS and Reference Paper principles to the settlement of 
international traffic. The Panel’s interpretation of the interconnection disciplines of the 
Reference Paper invites a deeper thinking on the importance of early tariff rebalancing 
and the fate of the accounting rate regime in the context of global transformation of the 
sector. Given the complexity of these issues, and to help avoid future WTO-related 
pitfalls, governments may benefit from drawing upon telecommunications and trade 
expertise to assist them in the planning and implementation of reforms upon which they 
wish to commit in GATS. 
 
The Reference Paper is a key element of the WTO framework for telecommunications 
services. While the Reference Paper leaves up to each member country the translation of 
guidelines into specific measures, the principles are clear, powerful, and, as illustrated by 
the Mexico case, ultimately enforceable. The Reference Paper provides an important 
blueprint of best practice for countries in the early stages of designing 
telecommunications policy, legislation, and regulation, particularly for countries that seek   17
to join the WTO. In this sense, a minimum common denominator of regulatory practice is 
building up among WTO member countries. Some authors, however, worry that these 
practices do not do full justice to the challenges faced by developing countries 
(Henderson et al. 2005). Not all international trade treaties have such an instrument.
36 
The GATS Annex on Telecommunications and the Reference Paper have also been used 
as templates for bilateral and regional trade agreements. More recently, some free trade 
agreements have improved on or gone beyond these GATS instruments.  
 
Multinational telecommunications companies take GATS seriously. They are well 
informed of the rights and benefits to which the GATS entitles them. The Mexico case 
suggests that suppliers are likely to increasingly use GATS commitments to secure 
markets and pursue GATS benefits. Indeed, many developing countries undertake the 
GATS commitments in the hope of attracting foreign investment from just such 
companies. Once having committed, however, countries will find it increasingly difficult 
to renege on their promises.   
 
The WTO dispute resolution mechanism will continue to be used only sparingly. It is 
governments, not companies, that have access to the dispute mechanism. A supplier has 
to convince its government to file a complaint before even the first formal consultative 
steps take place in the WTO framework. Large markets and those with  serious shortfalls 
in implementing scheduled commitments can expect to be the most likely candidates for 
future disputes. Among developing countries, issues regarding China, India, and Morocco 
have been arising (USTR 2004). Moreover, disputes can be resolved through bilateral 
efforts, without resort to formal WTO procedures, which are costly in terms of human 
resources and expert advice. Well-tried practices of private sector dispute resolution offer 
alternatives for dealing with conflicts among operating companies (Bruce et al. 2002).     18
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1 Attempts at the end of World War II to create an international trade organization to handle the trade 
aspects of international economic cooperation (as companion to the World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund) failed. Twenty-three of the 50 participating countries, however, agreed to negotiate to 
reduce customs tariffs, give an early boost to trade liberalization, and dismantle protectionist trade practices 
in place since the 1930s. These negotiations led in 1948 to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT). The GATT remained the only multilateral instrument governing international trade from 1948 
until the World Trade Organization (WTO) was established in 1995. Eight rounds of multilateral trade 
negotiations were held under the auspices of the GATT. The Uruguay Round of 1986-94 was the last and 
most extensive of all. It led to creating the WTO and a new set of agreements. A new trade round, now 
under the auspices of the WTO, was initiated in Doha, Qatar in 2001 and is still underway. For an 
introduction to the WTO and links to all major documents see www.wto.org .  
2 Under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), banks, insurance firms, telecommunications 
companies, tour operators, hotel chains, transport companies, and other service providers looking to do 
business abroad enjoy principles of free and fair trade that originally only applied to trade in goods. The 
GATS is a fairly concise document, 55 pages long in total, of which the main text has 24 pages and the 
Annex on Telecommunications has less than four pages. The country schedules add several thousand 
pages. Further details on the GATS are available on 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm6_e.htm . 
3 In lay terms, most favored nation treatment means that a member country will accord services and service 
suppliers of other member countries a treatment no less favorable than it accords to like services and 
service suppliers of any other country (whether a member or not). With respect to market access, a GATS 
member country must treat services and service suppliers of other member countries not less favorably than 
as specified in its schedule of specific commitments. National treatment means that, in the sectors inscribed 
in its schedule, a member country will accord services and service suppliers from other member countries a 
treatment no less favorable than it accords to like services and service suppliers of its own country. 
4 In lay terms, cross-border services are supplied from one country to another. Consumption abroad means 
services supplied in one country to consumers coming from another. Commercial presence occurs when 
entities of one country are located in another country where they provide services. And temporary presence 
of natural persons means services provided by nationals of one country in the territory of any other. 
5 An introduction to the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is available on 
 http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm  
6 The 15 countries of the European Communities shared one schedule. 
7 Despite its name, the ABTS is not a specific document. And it is not limited to basic telecommunications, 
since over 70 percent of schedules also refer to value-added services. A guide to telecommunications in the 
WTO is found on 
 http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/telecom_e/telecom_e.htm . 
8 Ten other countries have made commitments on value added services only. 
9 The third parties were Australia, Brazil, Canada, Cuba, the European Communities, Guatemala, 
Honduras, India, Japan, and Nicaragua. 
10 Loosely speaking, facilities-based services are those provided by suppliers using their own networks. 
Non-facilities based services, often referred to as resale, are provided by suppliers primarily using networks 
owned by others, through leasing or other commercial arrangements.  
11 Between the U.S. and Japan on interconnection, and between the U.S. and the European Communities on 
standards for licensing mobile services. 
12 Mexico had scheduled cross-border market access commitments, subject to the limitation that 
“International traffic must be routed through the facilities of an enterprise that has a concession granted by 
the Ministry of Communications and Transport.” Concession was defined as “The granting of a title to 
install, operate or use a facilities-based public telecommunications network”. See Mexico 2004, Schedule 
of Specific Commitments, section 2C. 
13 WTO 2004, para 7.40.   21
 
14 WTO 2004, para 7.42. 
15 WTO 2004, para 7.203. 
16 The Panel took this view in part from the ITU’s Recommendation ITU-T Rec. D.140 of June 2002, 
which set guidelines for establishing accounting rates for international telephone services. 
17 Ley Federal de Telecomunicaciones, Art. 63. The law gives Comisión Federal de Telecomunicaciones 
(COFETEL, the regulator) authority to impose on any concessionaire with substantial market power rates 
that aim at recovering at least the long run average incremental cost of a service. This measure is aimed at 
preventing predatory pricing.  
18 The accounting rate is the nominal price per unit of traffic agreed upon between two countries for the 
joint provision of service. Under this mechanism, operators in the originating country compensate operators 
in the country of destination for providing international circuits and switching capabilities and domestic 
routing to deliver the call to the recipient. In case traffic in one direction exceeds the other, the operator 
with more outbound traffic transfers funds to the other operator. The payment is called settlement payment. 
It usually equals one-half the accounting rate. 
19 TELMEX’s two largest competitors were Alestra, a subsidiary of ATT, and Avantel, a subsidiary of MCI 
(then WorldCom). ATT and MCI are major U.S. firms that had been excluded from TELMEX’s 
partnership with Sprint, another major U.S. firm. 
20 This dispels the view held by some member countries that the Annex on Telecommunications applies 
only to value-added services, not basic services. 
21 These rules apply to all services and technologies, with a view to facilitating convergence among and 
between services and networks. The rules are preceded by a detailed explanation of the background and 
rationales of the old and new rules. See COFTEL 2004. For a discussion of the new rules from the 
viewpoints of competition law and economics, see Carreño et al. 2005. 
22 This aspect of the old rules was not argued by the parties in the WTO dispute and thus was not 
considered by the Panel. 
23 COFETEL 2004, Regla 18. 
24 Outgoing traffic increased by only 9 percent. All traffic figures refer to minutes. 
25 By-pass: U.S. carriers, using cross-border private links, can avoid paying the uniform settlement rate and 
negotiate lower rates directly with Mexican operators. Although illegal in Mexico, this practice was driven 
by the large margins between termination costs and settlement rates, and attracted small Mexican operators 
that, because of the proportional return rule, did not benefit as much from the settlement revenues as the 
incumbent. Illegal bypass reportedly resulted in TELMEX losing in 2003 around $230 million or 20 
percent of its revenues from incoming U.S. calls.  
26 This is consistent with ITU guidelines that recommend that accounting rates should be cost-oriented and 
also now recognize a wide array of options beyond the traditional accounting rates regime. 
27 This, however, is a more flexible concept than that of cost orientation under the Reference Paper. 
28 For example, the U.S. Office of the Trade Representative has identified high fixed-to-mobile charges in 
Australia, burdensome licensing requirements in Colombia, poor quality and high prices of local access 
leased lines in Germany, and access deficit charges used in India to finance rural services as situations that 
could be addressed supported by the Panel’s arguments and findings. See USTR 2004. 
29 Fixed-to-mobile termination charges are still well above costs in many countries. While this may have 
been justified when mobile service was a nascent premium service, by now in many countries there are 
more mobile than fixed telephone connections and mobile service accounts for a large proportion of total 
sector revenue. 
30 The Panel stated, among other arguments, that if such were not the case, cross-border market access 
could only occur together with commercial presence, yet these two modalities have been defined separately 
in the GATS. 
31 According to this view, the U.S. operator provides a service to a customer located also in the U.S. and 
purchases termination services from a Mexican operator. The sale of termination services by the Mexican 
operator is an export to the U.S.. Mexico had not entered into commitments with respect to the export of 
telecommunications services. Moreover, the Reference Paper does not apply to cross-border supply at all 
but only to services supplied through commercial presence. See Neven et al. 2005. 
32 This historical perspective eventually was later also expressed by COFETEL as part of the rationale for 
Mexico’s new rules for international telecommunications services.   22
 
33 Under article XIX of the GATS, WTO members committed to the progressive liberalization of services. 
A new round of services liberalization was launched in early 2000. This GATS 2000 Round was then 
incorporated in a wider negotiating round launched during the 2001 Doha Ministerial Meeting.  
34 The Dominican Republic, Honduras, and El Salvador propose that the Reference Paper be applied in the 
tourism sector. 
35 The need to achieve a constructive dialogue between trade negotiators and sector specialists is key to the 
success of domestic reform through trade liberalization. It is an important challenge of the Doha Round that 
these two policy communities work in concert. See Mattoo et al. 2003.  
36 The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), for example, has only rudimentary provisions on 
telecommunications services and nothing equivalent to the Reference Paper. It has been argued that, for this 
reason, NAFTA has had little effect on cross-border telecommunications investment and services between 
the US and Mexico. Rather, it was only once the WTO telecommunications commitments came into force 
that US investors were able to enter the Mexican telecommunications markets and call charges between 
both countries began to drop. See Harris 2002.  